

Ready to Fight Over Quemoy and Matsu

# Ike Promised U. S. Defense of Islands

President Eisenhower three years ago sent Chiang Kai-shek a personal letter that satisfied the Chinese Nationalist leader "that the United States would help defend Quemoy and Matsu" if the communists attacked the islands, it was reported today.

The reported episode highlights a book about Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, written by John R. Beal, diplomatic correspondent for Time magazine.

Mr. Beal said the communists became convinced of this country's determination to fight for the offshore islands "and this was the knowledge that deterred them. This was the 'brink' in Formosa."

## ATOM THREAT

The book also says the Eisenhower Administration was prepared to use tactical atomic weapons if the communists renewed the fighting in Korea.

Mr. Beal said those who argued U. S. policy toward Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-55 could not possibly have known "all the facts" on which Mr. Dulles and the President based their actions and commitments.

"It was not known, for example, that Free China's President Chiang Kai-shek received a personal letter from Mr. Eisenhower satisfying him that the United States would help defend Quemoy and Matsu, for that fact has not appeared in print until now," Mr. Beal wrote.

Mr. Beal said Mr. Dulles agreed to include Quemoy and Matsu "by name" in the American-Chinese defense treaty signed Dec. 2, 1954.

## CROSSED OUT

President Eisenhower struck the two place names out when he saw the minutes of the talks," Mr. Beal added. "He felt the United States needed a certain flexibility in its defensive plans. At the same time he sent Chiang his personal assurance."

Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have declared publicly that the United States is committed only to defend Formosa and the nearby Pescadores Islands under the 1954 defense treaty. But they have implied this country would retaliate if the Reds attacked Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Dulles said March 3, 1955, the decision on use of American forces "will be made by the President himself in

the light of the circumstances at the time."

## OTHER HIGHLIGHTS

In his opening remarks, Mr. Beal said his book "benefits from personal interviews" with Mr. Dulles "which provided additional facts about his career and insight into his official actions . . ." He reported other highlights of Mr. Dulles foreign policy experiences as follows:

• Gen. Douglas MacArthur visited Mr. Dulles before the 1952 GOP nominating convention "to urge support of Taft (the late Sen. Robert A. Taft of Ohio) and told Dulles he could be Secretary of State in Taft's cabinet. Mr. Dulles had no such offer from the Ike camp" but "he decided that Ike was his man."

• Following Mr. Eisenhower's election, Gen. Lucius Clay and Herbert Brownell Jr. "called on Dulles immediately, with Eisenhower's offer of the State Department job in the Republican cabinet." Mr. Dulles had "certain reservations." Gen. Clay and Mr. Brownell convinced him he would be better off as Secretary of State than as executive director of the National Security Council—a post Mr. Dulles thought he might prefer.

• After Mr. Dulles took office "he attempted to maintain the principle of bi-partisanship by confidentially offering Adlai Stevenson . . . an appointment to the UN delegation. Mr. Stevenson for reasons of his own, chose to decline . . ."

• Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban was in the office of Assistant Secretary of State William Roundtree on Oct. 29 when Israeli forces attacked Egypt. Mr. Eban had just told Mr. Roundtree that Israel's mobilization "was defensive in motive, not aggressive."

• On Sunday, Oct. 28, the day before the invasion, U. S. Ambassador to Israel Edward B. Lawson reported that "despite the government's protests" that its mobilization "was merely defensive, he was convinced that Israel intended military action."

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